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Abstract. 
 
Who intends to leave Africa and what drives the pressure to emigrate? For four African countries (Ghana, 
Senegal, Morocco and Egypt) we evaluate the strength of push and pull factors in stating emigration intentions 
‘out of Africa’. In general, one can say that the typical potential migrant is young, male, optimistic about 
attaining a higher living standard and finding a job and having relatively modern values compared to those who 
intend to stay. Classical push factors like unemployment and poverty are present in most countries. The most 
notable finding is extent with which the optimism surrounding the net benefits of migration drives emigration 
intentions out of Africa, especially in Ghana and Senegal. Besides this general observation, each and every 
country tells a different story. Signs of positive self-selection with respect to the level of education of potential 
migrants are clearly present in Ghana and Egypt, especially among women. However, negative self-selection 
applies to the case of Moroccan men. The network effects of potential migrants turn out to be of some 
importance in Ghana and Egypt. However, in Senegal and Morocco such ties are apparently not as important as 
one might expect from studies of actual migration behaviour.  In Morocco the prevailing migration culture offers 
a plausible explanation and in Senegal the high frequency of migration in regions with an established migration 
history offers some of the services that network ties might offer.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Africa is a continent that does not raise high hopes among development experts. Gallup et al. 
(1998) predict that much of the population increase in the next thirty years is likely to take 
place in geographically disadvantaged regions in the world, notably Africa. High fertility rates 
together with low life expectancies tend to be associated with lower rates of saving and 
investment and therefore slower economic growth (cf. Bloom and Sachs, 1998). Hatton and 
Williamson (2002, 2003a) arrive at the conclusion that the emigration pressure in Africa for 
the next twenty years will be increasing, as the population age structure will continue to show 
increases in numbers of young adults, who might try their luck elsewhere. The lack of any 
economic growth prospects in Africa will only reinforce emigration pressure. The present 
state of Africa has not always been so dismal. In the sixties and the start of the seventies 
Africa’s future looked bright, but during the seventies economic and political matters in 
Africa deteriorated (Collier and Gunning, 1999). Since 1980, aggregate per capita GDP in 
Sub-Saharan Africa has declined at almost one percent per year and today sub-Saharan Africa 
is the lowest income region in the world. To many African citizens emigration ‘out of Africa’ 
seems to be the only way in their mind to improve their standard of living.1 
The above mentioned analyses and ‘guesstimates’ are primarily based on aggregate 
statistics and not much is known about the microeconomic causes and incentives that trigger 
migration in Africa, although not much is needed to imagine that the pressure to emigrate is 
real. This lack of knowledge is troubling as governments of destination countries are 
increasingly thinking about how to keep migrants out, without turning to the actual source of 
the emigration pressure. Migration and development policies might have a better chance of 
succeeding if both sides of the migration story – the circumstances in both the countries of 
origin and of destination - are taken into account (cf. Rotte et al., 1997, and Vogler and Rotte, 
2000). In that respect one can understand why Borjas (1994: 1668) in the recent past made the 
claim that “an assessment of the economic impact of immigration requires an understanding 
of the factors that motivate persons in the source countries to emigrate.” In the present paper 
we will examine precisely this point. We will concentrate on the issue of who intends to leave 
and who stays behind in a number of African countries (Ghana, Morocco, Senegal and 
Egypt). It is a question that goes to the heart of the debate about the causes and consequences 
of the so-called ‘brain drain’ or more generally the size and structure of the South-North 
migration flow. For both the destination and the source country it matters (1) how high the 
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migration flow is and (2) who leaves, as emigration will affect the age and sex structure of the 
population at large and the educational and skill composition of the labour force. 
By employing international migration surveys for these countries we are able to show 
how high the pressure to emigrate is and what kind of forces are at work when it comes down 
to forming emigration intentions. As migration is a volatile event and hard to predict, 
understanding intentions to emigrate from developing countries can be of some importance in 
putting the previously mentioned migration predictions in perspective. Besides using 
migration intentions as predictors of future emigration flows, we also think that intention data 
could alternatively be used as indicators of the state of a country as people are in fact giving a 
vote of confidence in the future of their home country vis-à-vis other countries. 
We are, of course, not the first to examine international migration intentions (cf. Burda 
et al., 1998, Faini, 1999, Papapanagos and Sanfey, 2001, Drinkwater, 2002, Liebig and Sousa-
Poza, 2004), but our research adds two novel elements that can be added to the empirical 
literature of intentions. First of all, we bring together micro-data about emigration intentions 
for a number of African countries (Ghana, Senegal, Morocco and Egypt), countries that differ 
quite distinctly by geographic position, state of economic development, and cultural setting. 
The conjectures and the aggregate predictions that are often made about the African continent 
are not based on micro-evidence, and as such this paper is – as far as we know - a first attempt 
at filling this void for Africa. 
Second, in modelling emigration intentions we will focus on structural characteristics 
that trigger self-selection or ‘push’ potential migrants and variables that ‘pull’ them towards 
the country of destination. Of course, modelling migration in such a manner is perhaps 
standard practice in estimating actual migration. However, within the economics literature 
that uses emigration intentions the simultaneous inclusion of push and pull factors is an 
exception. For instance, in the work Papapanagos and Sanfey (2001), Liebig and Sousa-Poza 
(2004) and Drinkwater (2002) expectations play no role at all and they concentrate solely on 
structural characteristics of potential emigrants. 
Of course, the use of expectations is more or less standard practice in social-
psychological work that draws on Ajzen (1988)’s theory of planned behaviour. In such studies 
migration is seen as a decision making process in which the future attainment of valued goals 
in the home community (the stay decision) is evaluated against the attainment of those goals 
in alternative locations (the move decision). Notably the work by De Jong (see for instance, 
De Jong, 2000) should be mentioned at this point as he has used expectations about a variety 
of factors. For instance, De Jong (2000) shows for internal migration in Thailand that 
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expectations concerning a variety of dimensions about the destination (standard of living, 
comfort, social support network) along with family norms about migration are major 
predictors of the intention to move, in particular for women. However, his work primarily 
concentrates on internal migration in developing countries and offers no comparison for our 
work, which focuses on expectations in the perspective of international migration. 
Furthermore, in estimating intentions we have purged the effects that structural individual 
characteristics might have on the expectations about the net benefits of migration and 
constructed a variable that approximates the individual-specific optimism surrounding these 
benefits. As will become clear individual optimism about the benefits of migration are the 
prime driving force behind emigration intentions. Whether optimism is identical to 
overconfidence or overshooting is unclear at this point as intentions are at the focus of 
attention and not actual behaviour. But the fact that great expectations have such a strong 
impact on intentions point at a potentially simple explanation of why it is so hard to redress 
South-North migration flows. 
After this introduction we will first discuss briefly the theory behind emigration 
intentions in section 2 and the role expectations play in this regard. Subsequently we will turn 
to the data in section 3, where the background of the survey is presented together with some 
salient stylized facts about the four African countries. In section 4 we expand briefly on the 
method of estimation and the model to be estimated. In section 5 we present the estimation 
results for the four African countries. In section 6 we test for the robustness of these results by 
examining intentions of both men and women. We conclude our paper with a summary of the 
main conclusions in section 7. 
 
2. Theory of Emigration Intentions  
Basic economic theory of migration2 stresses that differences in (expected) net returns across 
countries as the prime driving force behind emigration movements. A migrant with skill level 
S who moves from a poor country (denoted by a P) to a rich country (R) compares the two 
income level he 3 might receive. In the poor country he knows what he receives and will 
probably receive over his remaining lifetime, viz. E[WP(S)] and he expects that the wage for a 
worker with comparable skill level S in the rich country receives E[WR(S)] where clearly 
E[WR(S)] > E[WP(S)]. Income flows are discounted in order to compare this future income 
flow with his present wage. However, in deciding to migrate the potential migrant subtracts 
the costs C(S) tied to moving abroad from the expected wage. The costs can be split up into 
explicit, once-and-for-all migration costs (transport, legal papers, etc.) and indirect, but 
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nonetheless important costs of migration, such as the psychic costs of leaving family and 
country, net social security benefits or taxes, adjustment costs in the country of destination, 
etc. Of course, the costs can also be tied to immigration policies that the potential migrant 
encounters. Point systems used by countries like the Australia, New Zealand and Canada, 
where age, language fluency and education are important selection criteria for gaining 
entrance in these countries pose considerable costs as potential migrants will have to invest in, 
e.g., education to be able to earn the threshold number of points for obtaining a visa. Taking 
all relevant variables together, the individual living in the poor country will migrate as long 
as: 
 
)]([)]()([ SWESCSWE PR >-   
    
In making emigration decisions there are processes at work that seem to lead to self-selection 
among migrants as the net benefits of migration are not the same for everyone (see Chiswick, 
1999). Furthermore, in predicting who will emigrate it matters what the structure of 
information asymmetry looks like across migrants and potential employers in the country of 
destination. This element is at the focus of attention in the theory of adverse selection. This 
theory basically boils down to the proposition that in the presence of asymmetric information 
and the absence of signalling or screening by market participants only the ‘bad quality’ 
products are traded in equilibrium. This theorem can easily be applied to the questions of 
migration, as Katz and Stark (1987) show, in which case the proposition reads as follows: in 
the absence of signalling or screening, only the low skilled or low educated are the ones who 
emigrate. Of course, signals such as education and screening by employers do play a role in 
obtaining employment abroad, thereby leading to more complex migration flows in which, 
e.g., only the high skilled and low skilled migrate (Katz and Stark, 1987: 721-723). The 
theory of adverse selection focuses on the information asymmetry between employers and 
employees. 
A shortcoming of the analysis by Katz and Stark (1987) is that it does not deal 
explicitly with the formation of expectations which migrants have about the prospective wage 
or income level abroad. In making decisions the potential migrant has to form expectations 
and our hunch is that part of the migration flows ‘out of Africa’ can be explained by paying 
attention to the formation of expectations. Expectations open the possibility of overshooting 
or undershooting in migration. For instance, the existence of a migration culture in which 
everyone intends to emigrate or plans to emigrate can be simply the result of expectations that 
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are out of touch with the actual circumstances abroad. As a consequence of, for instance, an 
overoptimistic population, an inefficient number of migrants will leave the country. Take a 
look at Figure 1 where net wage curves are given under conditions of complete certainty in 
such a manner that migrants of skill level S and higher will leave the country as at that point 
WR – C > WP.  
 
HERE FIGURE 1 
 
However, if expectations are such that across the entire population in the source country wage 
expectations are shifted upwards towards W’R, the potential migrants can under those 
circumstances be found in the pool of skill level S’ and higher (where S’ < S). In other words, 
the pool of migrants leaving the country is of undereducated or underskilled and within this 
simple framework the group (S – S’) will be disappointed as their real wage in the country of 
destination will fall below their expected wage.4 One can even think of the situation in which 
wage expectations are so high that the entire population, no matter what skill level, will be 
eager to move abroad. Of course, optimism is bound to differ across individuals and the 
assumptions under which a genuine migration culture exists are quite stringent. Much depends 
in questions of self-selection on the height and slopes of the relevant net wage curves. 
Unfortunately one can therefore not predict on a priori grounds who will migrate and who 
will stay. Empirical evidence has to shed light on the characteristics of potential migrants. 
 
Intention theory 
In this study we will not use revealed emigration behaviour but we will focus on stated 
emigration intentions. Using intentions as an approximation of future emigration decisions is 
a reasonable research strategy as long as one is aware of the pros and cons of using such 
stated preferences. A clear advantage in the use of migration intention data is that it allows 
one to test self-selection theories without having to deal with sample selection problems that 
are tied to host-country data. Quite a number of studies that test for self-selection of migrants 
rely on host-country data and as Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004: 126) point out such an 
approach can become problematic as specific host-country characteristics such as migration 
policy, historical links and geographical proximity are bound to bias immigration to these 
countries. 
 Most researchers who use intention data refer to the so-called ‘theory of reasoned 
action’ of social psychologists (see Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; and Ajzen, 1985, 1988) as their 
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basic frame of reference. This theory revolves around the hypothesis that a person’s intention 
to undertake a certain action (e.g., investment, labour supply, giving up smoking, etc.) is a 
function of, amongst other factors, the beliefs about the consequences of a certain action. For 
the case of emigration this implies that the person makes a mental map of the costs and 
benefits that are tied to the decision to emigrate. The decision to migrate becomes a real 
option in the minds of non-migrants when the present value of benefits exceeds the present 
value of costs. Intention theory is in that respect not that much different from economic 
theory, albeit that the social-psychological factors that impinge on decision making is far 
larger and more difficult to explicate. 
Using intentions warrants a number of comments as the analysis of intentions is, 
however, riddled with difficulties and pitfalls that are hard to reconcile if one wants to use 
intentions as predictors of future behaviour. The framing of questions - it matters whether the 
question is open ended or whether it is a ‘forced choice’ question - and the fact that the 
information available at the time when people form their intention and the information they 
possess when the actual steps are taken may differ substantially are good reasons to interpret 
intention data with care. Unfortunately, the available data do not allow us to test the 
relationship between intended and actual decisions. Still, as Manski (1990) makes clear in a 
short review on the subject, intention data do convey information about subsequent behaviour 
and at most one can estimate the bounds so as to test the ‘best case’ hypothesis, i.e. the 
respondent has rational expectations and their responses to questions are best predictions of 
their future behaviour. Furthermore, social psychologists are fairly confident about the 
applicability of the relation between intentions and actions. The so-called ‘theory of reasoned 
action’ (Ajzen, 1985: 15) “permits highly accurate predictions in a wide variety of 
behavioural domains.”  However, one does have to be careful in making this claim as not 
every individual decision problem fits the problems social psychologists refer to. The tacit 
assumption behind the theory of ‘reasoned action’ is that, barring unforeseen events, people 
are expected to act in accordance with their intentions and in a rational manner. Another 
assumption is that individuals perceive to be in control of what lies between their stated 
‘intention to move’ and the actual move abroad (i.e. their so-called ‘self-efficacy’). In other 
words, whether they believe they can “make things happen”. 
Of course, intentions can change over time, not only because of preference drift but 
primarily because circumstances change and so will expectations. The accuracy of predictions 
based on intentions will probably be an inverse function of the time interval between 
measurement of intention and the observation of the intended behaviour. This is especially 
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relevant in the case of migration. For instance, voting for a specific politician or watching a 
specific television program are decisions that are easily performed and cover a short horizon, 
whereas the volitional control may be extremely low in the case of emigration. 
Most studies on migration intentions (De Jong et al., 1996; Sandu and De Jong, 1996; 
De Jong, 2000; Fawcett, 1986; Hughes and McCormick, 1985, Gordon and Molho, 1995; Lu, 
1999; Yang, 2000) focus on internal or regional migration as such migrants are relatively 
easily traced for a follow-up survey to check on the realisation of these intentions. The results 
of these studies are encouraging. De Jong (2000) shows for the case of Thailand how the 
intention to migrate can be a powerful predictor of the actual decision to emigrate 
permanently. However, little is known about the extent to which intentions to move abroad 
lead to actual migration, but one can imagine that the gap between intention and action will be 
large, at least larger than for internal migration data. Prospective migrants are not only in need 
of resources to finance their move abroad but they also need to surpass formal barriers as 
obtaining a visa, residence permits, and/or work permits; legal papers which are increasingly 
hard to obtain. Gardner et al. (1986: 70) present some evidence that potential international 
migrants in the Philippines who did not realise their intentions were mainly thwarted by legal 
migration hurdles. Intentions to migrate internationally seem to reflect therefore the 
willingness to act upon opportunities, in the realisation that such opportunities may be slow to 
arise and quickly fade away if they arise. 
 
Modelling intentions 
Most of the international migration intention studies take as a starting point to examine the 
structural characteristics (age, sex, marital status, education, profession) of potential movers 
and stayers. To compare results across studies verges on the impossible as each and every 
study takes a different tack, employs different methods and uses different theories to shed 
light on migration intentions. Furthermore, it is unfortunate that research on African data is 
lacking which would give us to possibility to compare results. 
Still, an overall conclusion about intentions to emigrate is that these intentions are 
significantly higher among young (and single) men. Being unemployed or being educated 
provides also a stimulus to consider a move abroad more seriously, although these results do 
not show up for each and every country. For instance, Papapanagos and Sanfey (2001) use the 
Central and Eastern Europe Eurobarometer of 1992 to examine emigration intentions in 
Albania in particular and - as to be expected with countries in turmoil - the willingness to 
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move abroad was extremely high, especially among men: more than 70 percent express an 
intention to move to Western Europe, compared with just over 50 percent of the women. 
To compare these intentions with some more recent research the papers of Drinkwater 
(2002) and Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004) may be instructive. They used the 1995 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in order to shed some light on the willingness 
to move of residents of Western developed countries and those of Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEEC) and they come up with a relatively surprising result that the 
willingness the move abroad is lower in the CEECs than it is in the EU. It is surprising 
because it stands in marked contrast with the figures presented in Papapanagos and Sanfey 
(2001) of the early 1990s and because the scheduled enlargement of the EU is thought to be 
accompanied by large scale migration flows (see, e.g., Blanchard, 2002). Furthermore, it 
should be noted that the EU population is not particularly known for being highly mobile (see, 
e.g., Faini, 1999). With hindsight it may, however, be quite easily explained why these 
researchers find such diverging results: the question posed in the ISSP-questionnaire captures 
the ‘willingness to move’ (“Would you be willing to move to another country to improve your 
work or living conditions?”), whereas Papapanagos and Sanfey (2001) ask for the ‘probability 
of moving’ (“How likely is it that you will move to Western Europe?”). It goes without saying 
that willingness to move is a concept where the commitment is rather low, contrary to the 
‘intention to move’ which forces respondents to make some (weak) form of commitment. 
 
…and expectations 
In our view, expectations about the costs and benefits tied to moving abroad are a crucial 
ingredient in understanding the formation of emigration intentions, besides other structural 
characteristics. O’Connell (1997) shows that predictions of migration under conditions of 
uncertainty are quite sensitive to the structure of information and the type of uncertainty that 
is assumed. In general one can distinguish between two types of uncertainty that matter in 
decision making for a potential migrant: uncertainty referring to (1) current conditions in the 
destination country that may not be observable; and (2) the future evolution of conditions in 
both the source and the destination country. The first type of uncertainty may trigger so-called 
speculative migration, i.e. migrants will just “try their luck” in foreign labour markets. The 
other type of uncertainty about the future net benefits may discourage migration as migrants 
may just “wait and see”, i.e. they will wait until some of the uncertainty has resolved. 
O’Connell’s theory offers a plausible theory why not everyone migrates in the face of 
diverging wage developments. Empirical tests of this theory are scarce, although the work by 
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Burda et al. (1998) can be seen as the exception to the rule. They study East-West German 
migration intentions and focus on the opportunity costs of migrating today instead of 
tomorrow or the distant future. The theory of the option value of waiting is that individuals do 
not immediately move in response to observed wage differentials because of uncertainty 
about future wage levels. It may very well be optimal to ‘wait and see’ and postpone 
migration until some of the uncertainty at home and at the destination is resolved. Burda et al. 
(1998) show how the effect of income on migration intentions takes a U-shaped form, which 
they interpret as an effect that is compatible with the option value theory, but which could 
also be accounted for by borrowing constraints in financing migration. They acknowledge the 
exploratory character of their work and the need for more information in estimation in order 
to identify which forces are operative and for which individuals. Our work can be seen as 
complementary to this type of work as we explicitly include expectations about the net 
benefits of migration, although a replication of their work is impossible as income in the 
surveyed countries is not registered as a continuous variable and in Africa income is a far 
more diffuse concept than it is in highly developed countries.5  
 
3. Data 
 
3.1 Migration survey 
To assess motives, expectations and intentions to emigrate we have used special purpose 
migration surveys. In the years 1997/1998 international migration surveys were implemented 
in a number of developing countries to explore the forces that push potential emigrants out of 
a country or that pull the potential emigrant towards specific countries, in particular countries 
in the European Union. 6 For the purpose of the project, primary data have been collected on 
individuals, their households and their communities in a number of countries, focussing on 
South-North flows to the European Union. Co-ordinated by NIDI (Netherlands 
Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute), seven research teams located in Mediterranean and 
West-African countries participated in the project: predominantly migrant-sending countries 
Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, Senegal, and Ghana, and the newly immigrant-receiving countries 
Italy and Spain. In the present article we will only focus on the four sending countries in the 
African continent: 
· Morocco. This is a country with a long tradition of emigration towards Europe. Since the 
1960s emigration of Moroccan workers has taken place, heading mainly for France which 
recruited several tens of thousands of unskilled workers over a period of 15 years. Other 
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European countries also sought to recruit Moroccans, such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands and to a lesser extent Germany. For the Moroccan government this 
emigration fitted with their strategy of coping with high unemployment and benefiting 
from the migrants’ remittances. After the recruitment of so-called ‘guest workers’ in the 
early and mid-1970s ceased, migration flows continued through family reunification and 
family formation (by marriage). The attachment of Moroccan emigrants to their country 
has generally not diminished and the strength of family ties also explains the emergence 
of migration networks which have made it possible to maintain migration to EU countries, 
in spite of the stricter immigration controls instituted by host countries to control these 
flows. The worries of host country (European) governments about the emigration of 
Moroccans seem to be justified as their capabilities and values do not seem to be in tune 
with the Western world: illiteracy rates are high, especially among women and the official 
language is Arabic. Practically all Moroccan citizens belong to either the Arab or the 
Berber ethnic group; and almost all are Muslims. 
· Egypt. For Egypt emigration has always been much more important than immigration. At 
the time of the survey it was estimated that about two million Egyptians lived abroad. 
Economic motives are dominant in triggering migration. From the mid-1960s to the mid-
1970s, mostly unskilled rural workers left Egypt. In more recent times, when Saudi Arabia 
became their favourite destination, the proportion of skilled migrants strongly increased. 
The educational level in Egypt remains low, especially for women. Illiteracy rates among 
women are still very high (61 percent in 19950 and tend to be concentrated in the poorer 
rural areas. Ethnic groups are predominantly Egyptians, Bedouins and Berbers. The vast 
majority of the population (94 percent) is Muslim, mostly Sunni. Arabic is the official 
language. The pressure to migrate is high in Egypt as living standards are quite low and 
the lure of the West and the OPEC-countries will keep the pressure going. The importance 
of remittances for the economy of Egypt has increased tremendously as it is by far the 
largest source of ‘foreign’ income. 
· Senegal is a former colony of France and gained independence in 1960. Although few 
estimates of international migration flows to and from Senegal suggest a zero net 
migration balance it would seem more appropriate to assume that, given the low level of 
development and future prospects, Senegal faces a negative migration balance. The 
population of Senegal incorporates a diversity of ethnic groups. The largest of these 
include the Wolof (44 percent) and the Fulani and Tukulor (24 percent). French is the 
official language of Senegal, although Wolof is the most widely understood of the many 
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African languages. The large majority of the population is Sunni Muslim (90 percent) and 
about 6 percent is Christian. The state of development of Senegal is even worse than that 
of Morocco and Egypt. Senegal is predominantly agricultural (70 percent of the labour 
force) and illiteracy rates are astoundingly high: three out of every four women aged 15 or 
older cannot read or write. Although education is compulsory in Senegal actual attendance 
rates are low and child labour is quite high (30 percent of all children aged 10-14). 
· Ghana reveals a quite different story compared to the previous three countries: it used to 
attract many migrants from other African countries to work in cocoa production, but due 
to structural economic downturns it has now become a major emigration country. It is 
estimated that about ten percent of the Ghanaian population live abroad, especially in 
Nigeria. Ghana is also more ethnically diverse than, e.g., Moroccans, as there are six main 
ethnic groups of which the Akan (Ashanti and Fanti) are the most numerous group. Ghana 
seems to more in tune with modern values than the other observed countries as half of the 
population is Christian, English is the official language and the government is dedicated to 
strongly reducing the illiteracy rate. 
 
To return to the set-up of the migration survey, in principle, all persons between the ages of 
18 and 65 belonging to the household were eligible for an interview, including those who 
were presently living abroad. For those current migrants who were not present, information 
was gathered using proxy-respondents. The selection of the sending countries was based on 
the desire to capture typical migration flows in the region from the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa. Other selection criteria included the existence of a 
varied destination pattern of migrants, and different histories and colonial ties. 
 In order to facilitate interviewing, to study chain migration, and to reduce difficulties in 
finding international migrants in the countries of emigration (a problem not unlike finding 
needles in a haystack), the sample designs were targeted at specific regions. Using expert 
knowledge, in each country several regions were selected, depending on the level of 
development (relatively low versus relatively high) and the history of migration (long-
established versus fairly recent). Regions characterised by very limited international migration 
were not included. Within the regions chosen, multistage, stratified cluster samples of migrant 
and non-migrant households were taken. As a consequence of regional sampling, it should be 
noted that the results of the study do not reflect migration from the countries as a whole, but 
only from the regions selected.7 
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3.2 Descriptive statistics and empirical puzzles 
We will first introduce some statistics on emigration intentions for the four African countries 
to get a feel for the importance of the phenomenon and the differences across countries. For 
the purpose of this paper, the key question in the survey was a question probing the intentions 
of respondents who never emigrated before: “Do you intend to migrate abroad?’ The possible 
answers were “yes”, “no” and “don’t know”. The respondents who had answered positively to 
this question were asked to indicate their intended departure period and to specify whether 
they had taken steps to obtain required documents (passports, visas, residence or work 
permits, etc.). In addition to these emigration intention questions, respondents were asked to 
indicate their main motivation for emigrating and their preferred country of destination. Table 
1 summarises the main motives to migrate or to stay and intentions among non-migrants, i.e. 
persons with no international migration experience. Return migrants were excluded from our 
study. 
 
Here Table 1 
 
Evidently, there are clear differences in emigration intentions across countries. It is worth 
noting that the intention to emigrate is especially high among Ghanaians and Senegalese, 
whereas emigration intentions are low in Egypt. The main reason why can be traced to the 
stated motives to stay, among which family ties figure prominently. Finally, these figures 
could cover up the fact that the sex composition of the groups under consideration differ 
markedly. The intention to move abroad is significantly higher among men compared to 
women. More specifically, the intention to move is highest among men from Ghana and 
Senegal, where approximately 50 percent of the male respondents indicated that they intend to 
emigrate. Moroccan and Egyptian men are less set on migrating with 33 and 21 percent 
respectively saying they intend to emigrate. Women are less adamant in their intentions: only 
4 percent of the (non-migrant) women from Morocco and Egypt state that they intend to 
emigrate whereas Ghanaian and Senegalese women are more eager on moving abroad: 37 
percent and 26 percent respectively. 
 
Motivation: economic 
The next question that was raised in the questionnaire was: why do you intend to emigrate? 
The main answers unequivocally point to economic motives underlying the intention to 
emigrate in these countries. The reason for stating these motives are, of course, rooted in the 
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present day economic circumstances and developments over time. However, it is quite hard to 
distinguish which economic factor dominates. Poverty could be a driving force as well as the 
fact that one expects that migration is a financially profitable move. Poverty is however an 
ambiguous explanatory factor as insufficient means may perhaps be a reason for emigration, 
but it could just as well be barrier to move as liquidity-constrained individuals can not afford 
the costs of emigration. The financial attractiveness of emigration, on the other hand, makes a 
plausible and unambiguous factor as the income gap between the industrialised world and the 
developing world only seems to have increased over the years. If we just take a look at the 
gap between GDP per capita in the countries under consideration and that of, for instance, the 
average US citizen (see Figure 2 below) then one can understand that the lure of ‘going West’ 
(USA) or North (Europe) is a real driving force for most respondents. The gap between Africa 
and the developed world (in the figure represented by the US) was already large fifty years 
ago, but in the mean time the gap has only widened, making migration a more and more likely 
step for these citizens. Macroeconomic studies of international migration by Hatton and 
Williamson (2003a) and Vogler and Rotte (2000) make clear that the income differential is an 
important driving force, especially for Africans. 
 
Here Figure 2 
 
The income per capita of the US citizen is right now more than 20 times as large as the per 
capita income in Ghana and Senegal, whereas over almost half a century ago the income 
distance between the US and these countries was a factor 8. Egypt and Morocco are countries 
with a slightly better track record although they too have not shown any sign of a ‘catching 
up’ process over almost fifty years. Given the large gap in income it makes sense to evaluate 
how economic incentives, expectations and individual characteristics, like employment status 
and education, affect the individual respondent’s intentions to emigrate. 
 
…also for women? 
However, microeconomic motives are generally not as important for the women, as they state 
more often than men that family reasons are an important drive for emigration. Traditionally, 
the women from the Muslim countries Morocco and Senegal, have migrated mostly within the 
framework of family reunification, or to marry a compatriot who was already residing abroad. 
This road was mostly closed to Egyptian women as their husbands are more likely to live in 
the Gulf region, where family reunification is the exception rather than the rule. An exception 
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should be made for Ghana where differences between men and women are negligible: both 
men and women are guided in their intentions primarily by economic reasons. Ghanaian 
culture does not frown upon women migrating alone, to the extent that the other three Muslim 
societies do, and this, combined with the greater likelihood of financial independence of 
women in Ghana, is likely to influence their migration perspectives and intentions. 
Overall, the results of the migration surveys confirm that this motive is important for 
the respondents in African countries, as shown Table 1. Most of the men state economic 
reasons as their primary reason for intending to move abroad, whereas women are influenced 
by a mixture of family reasons and economic reasons. ‘Economic reasons’ is, however, quite 
a broad category of motives as it can cover up the influence of education, unemployment, 
poverty, wealth, search costs, to name just a few elements that enter economic theory. To 
unravel this motive we have tried to discern the separate effects of the most common elements 
of economic theory. 
 
Preferred country of destination 
In addition to the information on intentions, the survey also contains some information on the 
preferred country of destination of the respondents (see Table 2) and in this respect one has to 
conclude that preferences of potential migrants are quite different across countries but no so 
much within countries. Ghanaians and Senegalese by and large prefer the USA as their 
ultimate destination, whereas Egyptians are clearly oriented towards the Middle East, and 
Moroccans have their minds set at Mediterranean countries in Europe (Spain, Italy and 
France). These intentions partly reflect the destinations of recent emigrants, although the US 
tends to be somewhat more favoured among potential emigrants. 
 
Here Table 2 
 
To see how little preferences differ within countries Table 2 offers some suggestive statistics 
with respect to the geographical concentration of preferred countries of destination. Two-third 
of the group of potential migrants (among the non-migrants) expresses an interest in one of 
the top-3 countries of destination. An additional interesting finding is that the European Union 
(EU-15) is apparently an attractive country of destination for potential migrants from 
Morocco, but for Senegal and Ghana the EU attraction is moderate (50 percent choose it as 
their preferred destination) and in Egypt the EU is almost out of sight as a preferred 
destination only 13 percent expresses some interest in the EU. 
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A potential factor that might explain this conformity of emigration preferences is the 
presence of a social network (having relatives abroad or knowing former migrants). Although 
the potential migrants are a subgroup who have expressed an interest in emigrating and 
thereby a preference for a country of destination, it stands to reason that social networks may 
also trigger emigration intentions as such and explain the displayed conformity of destination 
choice. Furthermore, networks play a crucial role in actual migration decisions and it would 
be of interest to see whether this also applies at the stage of forming intentions. 
 
How firm are intentions? 
Before moving on to examining the survey data in more detail one final aspect of the data 
should be mentioned which concerns the firmness of intentions. At this stage, it would 
perhaps be tempting to predict a large outflow for the surveyed countries in the near future, 
but putting intentions into practice is an entirely different issue. In other words, a simple ‘yes-
no’ answer to the question about the intention to move abroad does not suffice as a firm 
foundation for predicting a forthcoming migration move. Respondents who answered ‘yes’ 
may not be sure if or when they will actually emigrate, or they may be pretty sure about the 
timing of their move but have not yet taken any concrete steps. 
 
Here Table 3 
 
Table 3 sheds some light on how firm intentions to emigrate are. Evidently, potential migrants 
from Ghana are more adamant in effectuating an intended move, whereas respondents from 
Senegal are less adamant about their move. What is most striking of course, is the large 
difference between general intentions and actions taken. Partly this may be explained by the 
fact that as soon as people have obtained the necessary documents and funding, they do 
indeed migrate, leaving thus little chance for them to be included in the survey. Partly, it 
signifies the large discrepancy between migration intentions and migration behaviour, in the 
face of the obstacles people face in moving abroad. 
 
All in all, the descriptive statistics behind the intentions to move ‘out of Africa’ generate 
some puzzles that we examine in the next sections. We are primarily interested in who leaves 
and who stays, and in getting some grip on this question we would like to answer, first of all, 
whether and to what extent the push or pull factors are responsible for triggering the high 
emigration intentions. Second, are there self-selection effects present at the stage of forming 
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intentions, i.e. are the higher educated more eager on emigrating than the population with no 
or just primary education, or is it the other way around? Third, we know from actual 
migration decisions that social networks play a crucial role in facilitating migration, but an 
unresolved question in the migration literature is whether the social networks play a similar 
role at the stage when intentions are formed.  
 
 
4. Estimation model 
 
4.1 Method of estimation 
In order to deal with the fact that migration intentions vary in intensity, as shown by Tables 3, 
we will use ordered probit analysis. Ordered probit is an appropriate estimation technique 
when the dependent variable is categorical and ordered. For instance when people are asked 
whether they intend to emigrate and they respond with a ‘yes’, they may not be able to 
accurately say when they will emigrate but they surely can indicate whether they are unsure 
about it or whether moving abroad is a highly likely event. In other words, they can rank their 
probability of moving abroad. In ordered probit analysis an underlying score is estimated as a 
linear function of the independent variables and a set of threshold points. The probability of 
observing outcome i (e.g., the intention to emigrate within a year) corresponds to the 
probability that the estimated linear score function Sj = b1x1j + b2x2j +… bkxkj plus the random 
error uj, is within the range of threshold points estimated for the outcome: 
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where the error term uj is assumed to be normally distributed. With ordered probit analysis 
one estimates the model coefficients b1, b2,… bk, along with the threshold points k1, k2,… 
kH-1, where H is the number of possible outcomes. In our case of explaining emigration 
intentions there are three threshold points as there are only four possible outcomes in 
constructing the intention to migrate, to wit: 
 
(1) No intention to move abroad; 
(2) Yes, but unsure when;  
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(3) Yes, but over a year or more; and 
(4) Yes, within a year. 
 
The intention question also included a “don’t know” option and this outcome category is left 
out of the analysis because it is hard to rank this category unambiguously and our interest is 
mainly in those respondents who express more or less clear intentions. 
 The estimated threshold points guide the interpretation of the estimated coefficients as 
they indicate how important a variable (e.g., a character trait of non-migrants) is for predicting 
the likelihood of moving abroad. For instance, for each observation j one can calculate the 
score function (Sj) and the true frequency that individual j will not migrate if Sj + uj £ k1, and 
that he or she is unsure about the move abroad: k1 < Sj + uj £ k2, etc. Thus one can predict, 
based on the estimated coefficients, the likelihood of a particular emigration intention 
outcome.8 
The covariates xj include push and pull factors of migration. The push factors are the 
structural characteristics of the potential migrant and these are generally used in most 
migration intention studies. The pull factors are in our study the expectations concerning the 
net benefits of emigration. Because these variables play an important role in our estimation 
results some additional comments are warranted. It is highly likely that these expectations are 
to some extent dependent on the characteristics of the respondents. In order to cope with the 
independent effect of optimism on the intention to emigrate we used a two-step estimation 
method to separate the push (characteristics of the respondents, like education, age and sex) 
and pull (expected net benefits) more clearly. 9 In a first stage, we regress the list of 
characteristics on the variables describing the expected benefits and costs to emigration. At 
the second stage the residuals from these regressions are entered together with the variables 
describing structural characteristics in a regression that explains the intention to emigrate. The 
residuals from the first stage, i.e. the difference between actual and predicted expectations,  
may be interpreted as individual-specific degrees of optimism or pessimism since they have 
been purged of the characteristics that might be expected to determine the individual’s costs 
and benefits from emigration. 
  
4.2 Explanatory variables 
In examining the driving forces behind the emigration intentions we will use a number of 
explanatory variables that approximate theoretical concepts that are often used in migration 
and intention theory. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in our 
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estimations for respondents who have no experience in international migration (‘non-
migrants’). The variables are primarily individually based, but there are also variables 
constructed at the household level, like income and household connections with (former) 
migrants. 
 
Here Table 4 
 
The striking aspect of the Table 4 is the variance in answers of the individual characteristics 
of the population sample across the four countries. The only exception to this rule being the 
expectations concerning financial gains of migration: in all countries the large majority (63 to 
80 percent) of the various populations expects that emigration is a profitable move. 
 To focus on the most noticeable cross-country differences in Table 4 the sample 
population in Egypt and Ghana is relatively highly educated compared to populations of 
Morocco and Senegal, where approximately 75 percent of the respondents has no formal 
education whatsoever. The household income position of migrants differs also quite strongly 
as 70 percent of the non-migrants of Ghana and Senegal finds that the income is barely 
sufficient or plainly insufficient to buy daily necessities. The current work status differs quite 
distinctively across the four countries, a fact that seems to be driven primarily by the sex 
composition of the sample population as in Ghana, Senegal and Egypt the women dominate 
the population and only in Morocco men dominate the sample of non-migrants. Furthermore, 
in Muslim countries like Egypt the labour market status of women is concentrated mainly 
outside the labour market, viz. inside the home. This status contrasts with that of women in a 
country like Ghana where they are actively participating in gainful employment. 
The cultural differences across countries are also reflected in the answers to the 
question whether respondents approve of unmarried women migrating abroad for a couple of 
years. To capture the state of ‘modernity’ in African countries and its effect on migration the 
question was asked “Would you approve or disapprove of a young unmarried woman moving 
abroad to work there for a couple of years?” and as one can see from Table 4 Ghana is clearly 
the most tolerant among the four as two out of three respondents approves of single women 
migrating. Egypt is the mirror image of Ghana where 94 percent of the respondents 
disapproves of single women migrating. The other two countries are more divided on this 
question. It should, however, be pointed out that the sample means for this question for this 
question are affected by the sex composition (not shown here) of the various samples and 
therefore can cover up considerable differences. E.g., the disapproval rate in Senegal is 44 
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percent, but when one considers the differences across sexes it turns out that 53 percent of the 
men disapproves of single women migrating and 39 percent of the women disapproves such 
moves. Similar figures can be presented for Morocco, where respectively 58 and 33 percent of 
the men and women disapprove of single women moving abroad. In Ghana men and women 
are more alike in approving migration of single women, and the same consensus can be said 
to exist in Egypt albeit that the attitude towards single women migrating is completely 
reversed. 
 Another cultural question that is often mentioned in intentions research is a question that 
captures the sense of self-efficacy. The question “Do you think that in general it is possible 
for people to determine what happens in their lives, or do you think it is mostly up to fate?” 
generates quite strong differences across countries: in Ghana the large majority thinks it is 
possib le to determine what happens, whereas in the other three countries the large majority 
thinks it is up to fate, with Egypt as the most traditional society where 90 percent thinks it is 
not possible to determine outcomes in life. 
 
Expected Signs 
With respect to the model coefficients b i there are a number of predictions one can make 
based on migration (intentions) theory. First of all, one would expect age to be of influence as 
because the decision to emigrate involves a sense of flexibility and large investments (some of 
which are pecuniary, whereas other investments are less tangible) and this investment has to 
be recouped over the rest of the life course. One would therefore expect that emigration is 
concentrated among the young as they are the ones who have not yet settled down and who 
have few commitments. Most of them have not yet invested much in home-country-specific 
capital as their middle aged and older compatriots, thereby making it possible for them to 
switch countries, or at least consider switching countries as is the case in our survey. 
With respect to ties such as those embedded in the marital status or the ties within the 
household with current or return migrants one would expect to detect some influence on the 
intentions. Ties with a spouse or a former spouse signal that the respondent is less mobile than 
someone who has never been married. Furthermore, given the fact that traditional values 
about the role of women in society in quite a number of African countries are still quite 
dominant, one would expect women to be more hesitant in expressing intentions to emigrate 
as it are the men who often take the lead in migration, to be followed in time by their spouses. 
Traditions are also reflected in the sense of self-efficacy and intention theory would predict 
that those with a higher sense of self-efficacy are on average more set on moving abroad or 
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having more concrete plans than other potential migrants who lack this sense. Of course, 
measuring such a general attitude does not automatically apply to the case of emigration, it 
could just as well apply to any other decision process. 
Social network ties can be an important driving force in triggering emigration. It has 
been stressed in the literature that network ties across countries are extremely important as 
they lower the costs of adjustment for potential migrants (see e.g. Massey et al., 1998, Curran 
and Rivero-Fuentes, 2003). Emigrants often use their relatives in searching for a house and a 
job in the country of destination and barriers imposed by a foreign language can to some 
extent be circumvented by using the family network as contacts outside the network are 
sometimes minimal. To capture part of the network effects that are often stressed in migration 
decision making, we include a variable that characterises the household in which respondents 
live. We distinguish four types of households: (1) households consisting of non-migrants only 
(our benchmark household type), (2) households consisting of non-migrants and one or more 
return migrants, (3) households consisting of non-migrants and one or more current migrants; 
and (4) mixed migrant households in which non-migrants, return and current migrants are 
present. The reason for including this variable is that the presence of a household member 
with a current or past migration experience may affect potential migrants in the household to 
consider to also emigrate or at least affect the firmness of stated intentions. Return or current 
migrants in a household generally convey information on the pros and cons of emigration. A 
priori we may expect that such information is more readily available in households with 
migrants than in those without. However, it is not clear how the direction and the magnitude 
of the different network connections will affect stated intentions. Return migrants are different 
from non-migrants as their information is coloured by their experience and this experience 
might be either positive or negative. By the same token, current migrants whose information 
on finding jobs or housing is more up-to-date might just as well be positive of negative. 
Therefore, the mixed migrant household can be expected to be in a better position to inform 
potential migrants as different types of information are available. 
 
The element of education can play a prominent role as the theory of adverse selection has 
made abundantly clear. However, the empirical literature on migration is ambiguous about the 
importance and strength of selection effects. Borjas (1987, 1991) comes up with strong self-
selection effects, suggesting that primarily the lower skilled migrants are the ones who leave 
their country and enter the US, whereas Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) find ambiguous effects 
or effects that contradict Borjas’ findings. Although the nature of our data is quite different – 
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emigration intentions – it would be of interest to see whether the attained level of education 
has an independent effect on intentions. In other words, can one discern a self-selection effect 
at the stage when intentions are formed? The higher educated are perhaps the ones who are 
better informed about making a move abroad. Furthermore, the higher educated may 
generally be the ones who are sponsored by their family to go abroad as they are believed to 
have a better chance of making a living, of which those who stay behind can also profit by 
means of financial remittances (see Groenewold and Fokkema, 2002). The only comparable 
research on this topic (based on intention data) is the work Drinkwater (2002) and Liebig and 
Sousa-Poza (2004) who draw on the same database. The latter make even the rather bold 
claim based on their findings that positive self-selection “can be generally expected in 
international migration” (2004: 126). 
 Income is another ambiguous variable as being well off can signal that a respondent can 
afford the costs of migration as well as a stimulus to stay at home and the reverse applies, of 
course, to those who live in poverty: poverty can be an important stimulus to emigrate but at 
the same time it implies that one can be liquidity constrained and financing of the migration 
costs may well prove prohibitive. 
 Finally, we have controlled the regressions for the type of regions in which respondents 
were living. The survey sample was created along two dimensions – migration history and 
level of economic development – so the data offer us an opportunity to explore the influence 
of regional contexts. One of the reasons for using this distinction is to evaluate whether the 
level of economic development comes into play and whether there are traces of a ‘migration 
culture’ in stating migration intentions. It can be hypothesised that where migration is still a 
recent and relatively rare phenomenon, migration intentions might still be weak, as the idea of 
migration has not yet taken a firm hold. In a region with a long and established migration 
history going abroad may perhaps have become a ‘rite of passage’, whereas in recent 
migration regions the intention to move is still an adventurous and daring move and because it 
is such a daring move one would expect that network ties abroad exert a larger effect on 
emigration intentions in this region than in a region with a more established history of 
migration. The reference category is the region with a long or established history of 
emigration and a more developed status of economic development. The other regions are: 
more developed but with a recent migration history; less developed with an established 
migration history; and less developed region with a recent migration history. 
 
 
 22 
5. Estimation 
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the non-migrant population of working age (18-65 
years) in the four African countries. To make the separate contribution of expectations 
explicit we present two models per country: model 1 simply presents a reduced form model in 
which intentions are conditional on a number of individual characteristics; and model 2 
extends the previous model by including variables that approximate the individual-specific 
optimism with respect to the net benefits tied to emigration. Before we move on to discussing 
the estimation results it should be pointed out that adding individual specific expectations to 
the equation improves the explanatory power of model 1 quite distinctively. In summing up 
the driving forces behind the pressure to emigrate we will discuss the explanatory variables as 
they appear in Table 5. 
 
Here Table 5 
 
Age 
Most emigration studies reveal that emigrants are young and the results in Table 5 confirm 
this finding: the older a respondent is, the less likely he or she will state an intention to 
emigrate. Furthermore, one can also distil from the data the fact that the older one gets the 
firmer this intention becomes, i.e. the standard deviation declines steadily with increasing age. 
Both findings are in accordance with theory and related research. 
 
Sex and marital status 
The coefficients with respect to sex suggest that there are strong differences in expressing 
intentions in Morocco, Senegal and Egypt, whereas in Ghana the differences between males 
and females are relatively low. 
The ties implied by the marital status variable plays no role in determining emigration 
intentions. Only in Senegal can one trace some influence of the marital status, where being 
single triggers respondents to be more set on emigrating than those with marital ties. The 
absence of an effect of marital status is, however, somewhat puzzling. Part of the solution to 
this puzzle may be traced to the different (marital) roles played by men and women in African 
societies. The differences in decision making across men and women is already captured in 
the gender dummy and not by the marital status variable. In section 6 we will explore the 
issue of gender differences in more detail. 
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Education 
The effect that education has on emigration intentions is ambiguous if one takes a look at the 
estimation results for the four countries. Education clearly has a significant effect on the 
intention to emigrate in Ghana and Egypt: the effect on the intentions of those respondents 
with a higher education is twice as large as the intentions of those with a primary education. 
In short, judging from these intentions data there does appear to be some positive self-
selection effect present even before migration steps are actually taken. However, the positive 
self-selection of potential migrants does not appear to be a universal phenomenon. Negative 
self-selection is present in Morocco where the intention to move abroad is higher among 
uneducated respondents compared to those with primary school. Senegal is again somewhat 
different as non-migrants with a higher education display lower intentions than respondents 
with no education but respondents with a primary school diploma are more set on migrating 
than the uneducated. The negative selection effect of education in Senegal must, however, not 
be overstated as 95 percent of the respondents has only a primary education or no education at 
all. 
  
Evaluation of the present income position 
One would also expect that the income evaluation (representing a push factor to emigrate) 
would be a major driving force in the different African countries. To capture the income 
situation of individuals the question was asked: “Overall, is the financial situation of the 
household more than sufficient, sufficient, barely sufficient, or insufficient to buy all the basic 
needs?” An insufficient income position could be a sound reason for emigration and as Table 
5 clearly shows this is indeed the case for Ghana, Morocco and Egypt: compared to non-
migrants who considered the income of their household sufficient, the intention to emigrate 
for those with an insufficient income position is significantly positive. One exception to this 
rule should be mentioned out as those well-off in Ghana are more set on emigrating than the 
base category, households with sufficient income. Furthermore, poverty does not seem to be a 
general driving force to emigrate as the income level seems to play no role of importance in 
Senegal. 
 
Current work status 
The work status is a variable that affects migration intentions in a number of ways. Naturally, 
being unemployed is a status that may trigger thoughts of a move abroad and indeed the 
unemployed – even though the (unweighted) unemployment percentage in the population 
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sample varies from three to eight percent – are far more set on moving abroad, especially in 
Morocco, than the reference category – employees (or casual workers). For the unemployed 
migration clearly offers an alternative route to gainful employment. For those who are already 
active on the labour market, the calculus of migration is more complex. As one can see 
owners of a business or employers are less set on moving abroad than employees, which is 
quite understandable as employers, c.q. owners of businesses are more or less tied to their 
home country and moving abroad would involve large adjustment costs. Workers (casual 
labourers, employees or unpaid family workers) are in that respect far more flexible as they 
do not own physical assets that have to be sold in case of emigration. The fact that students do 
not differ much from the reference category (only in Ghana can one detect a weak negative 
effect) is perhaps also surprising as most studies of a brain drain would make one expect that 
students are dead set on moving to the US or Europe. 
 
Household connections 
The estimated coefficients in Table 5 show that the network effect exerts a clear positive 
influence on the intention to emigrate in Ghana and Egypt. In line with the hypothesis that 
mixed households convey more information than households with either current migrants or 
return migrants, the Egyptian respondents belonging to mixed household are somewhat more 
inclined to emigrate than those belonging to a current or a return migrant household. The 
mixed migrant household is, however, not such a widespread phenomenon in the samples of 
these countries (1 percent and 9 percent, respectively). Current migrant households are the 
more common type. 
The fact that network effects are not present in Morocco and Senegal casts doubt about 
the general claim in many migration studies that network effects are an important driving 
force.10 Because the absence of an effect is quite noteworthy we would like to put forward a 
number of reasons why strong network effects do not show up in our micro-data. 
First of all, we are dealing with intentions and not actual migration steps. Apparently, 
in the case of stating an intention to emigrate it is not so important to have connections as it is 
when actual migration steps are undertaken. It should, however, be noted that among the 
migrants who have a plan to migrate, in the case of Ghana, we do see a clear effect of 
networks on increasing the probability to migrate within the year. 
 A second explanation for the weak network effects may be the measurement of the 
network ties. However, in testing for the presence of network effects we have also used 
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alternative measures, such as the presence of a family member (brother, sister, parent or child) 
abroad, and this variable yielded similar weak results. 
 A third explanation for the weak effect of network ties is perhaps the most plausible 
one and this explanation amounts to the existence of a migration culture in certain localities 
or regions. The effect of a genuine migration culture would be that everyone – young and old, 
poor and rich, skilled and unskilled – would move if they had the chance. From field studies 
we know that in particular in Morocco and Ghana this type of migration culture exists. In the 
case of Morocco policy makers explicitly use emigration policy as a strategy to cope with the 
high unemployment and simultaneously benefiting from the benign effects of remittances 
migrants send to their family. For the case of Senegal such a general migration culture does 
not exist. However, the estimation results in Table 5 suggest for Senegal in particular that 
migration intentions are clearly higher in the established migration region of Dakar and Pikine 
compared to the region with a short history of migration of Diourbel and Tourba. This may be 
the alternative explanation why household ties are not so important in Senegal as the ties of 
the local population in the established migration region may be just as important in triggering 
intentions to emigrate. The coefficients of the regional dummies in the other countries provide 
us with no clear pic ture of the influence of regional migration history or the level of 
development.  
 
Norms and values 
In estimating the models of Table 5 the effect of norms surrounding emigration are of some 
importance, especially the attitude related to the possibility of single women migrating is 
clearly reflected in intentions in each and every country. Given the fact that Ghana is the most 
modern of the four African countries (only 18 percent of the Ghanaian population disapproves 
of single women migrating) it is perhaps not such a surprise that emigration intentions are also 
the highest of these four countries. 
The sense of self-efficacy is an entirely different story as this variable does not give 
such unambiguous effects: this attitude exerts an extremely weak effect in triggering 
migration intentions in Senegal and Morocco. And in Ghana and Egypt migration intentions 
are unaffected by this sense of self-efficacy. However, the absence of an effect or the presence 
of weak effects are understandable as we mentioned earlier that the sense of self-efficacy may 
well refer to other decision processes and not migration decisions in particular. To rephrase 
the argument: people can have a high sense of self-
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home country as they, for instance, think that they can make things happen in business or 
some gainful employment at home. 
 
Optimism about net benefits of migration 
To capture the influence of expectations we have included the answers to the question: “Do 
you think that moving abroad could improve your financial situation?” in model 2. As we 
explained earlier, these expectations are purged from interdependencies with the other 
explanatory variables by following a two-step estimation procedure. The first stage regression 
results are not presented here to keep the analysis as brief as possible.11 To mention just a few 
of the most salient outcomes of these first stage regressions: age and attitudes about single 
women migrating affect expectations negatively in all countries, i.e. the young have higher 
expectations than the old and ‘modern’ citizens have higher expectations than more 
‘traditional’ citizens. The effect of regional location of respondents affects their expectations 
only in Ghana and Egypt, where respondents who are located regions with a recent migration 
history have higher expectations than those situated in more established regions. 
With the help of these first stage regressions we constructed a measure of optimism of 
non-migrants by taking the difference between stated and predicted expectations. For each 
and every country the population is skewed towards the optimistic expectations, i.e. most 
respondents’ expectations exceed their predicted value. And as one can deduce from Table 5 
the optimism concerning financial gains tied to a move abroad is indeed a major driving force 
behind the intention to emigrate: the coefficients are, for each and every country, large and 
statistically significant. This effect clearly is important as the large majority of the 
respondents (between 64 and 80 percent, see Table 4) expect that moving abroad will improve 
their financial situation. 12 
Besides the optimism surrounding the gains there are also costs involved in moving 
abroad and one of those costs represents job search costs. In the survey the following question 
was asked: “Where do you think it is easier to find a job: in this country of in a European 
country? Respondents could choose between the options: (1) in this country, (2) both equally 
easy; or (3) in a European country. The same two-step estimation procedure is applied in the 
case of the expected financial gains question and again one should interpret the explanatory 
variable in terms of optimism (or pessimism). On the whole, most non-migrants in Ghana, 
Morocco and Senegal expect that finding a job in Europe is easier than in their home country. 
Non-migrants in Egypt are the exception to this rule, a divergence that seems to be directly 
related to the fact that the preferred country of destination does not coincide with Europe. 
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Most potential emigrants in Egypt are not focused on Europe at all but the Middle East, and 
the same applies to a lesser extent for Ghana where the US is the most popular country of 
destination. However, even though the question may not be relevant to all respondents the 
stance that is reflected in the expectations of finding a job in Europe does reveal something 
about their outlook. This optimistic stance is also reflected in the estimates of Table 5: 
respondents in Egypt who think finding a job in Europe is easier than in Egypt are particularly 
motivated to emigrate. 
 
6. Gender Differences in Migration Intentions  
Estimating relationships like those in Table 5 can cover up differences if groups differ 
considerably in their intentions. An important group distinction, certainly in the context of 
traditional African countries, is the one delineated by sex. One of the most striking and robust 
aspects of our migration research is that African men and women have different emigration 
intentions and this can be easily deduced from the estimation results of Table 5 where the 
dummy variable sex has large coefficients in traditional countries like Morocco and Egypt. 
Clearly, the cultural context of different countries affects migration decisions and this is 
relevant in Islamic countries, where it is generally less accepted that single women emigrate 
independently, or for married women to migrate alone leaving their husband and children 
behind. In these countries, as mentioned earlier, independent migration of women, not within 
the context of the family, is uncommon and generally frowned upon. The more generally 
accepted alternative of family reunification migration is rarely an option for Egyptian women 
whose husbands generally work in the Gulf region. Family reunification is in principle open 
to Senegalese women with husbands in Europe, although usually only for one of the wives in 
case of polygamous marriages; and for the wives of recent, often undocumented migrants, 
migration is not a very viable option either. 
 
Here Table 6 
 
To take account of gender differences in emigration we have re-estimated model 2 of Table 5 
for both men and women and the results are presented in Table 6. In re-estimating the model 
for the different samples of men and women a number of points stand out.13 First of all, men 
seem to be led by the great financial expectations and low job search costs in stating their 
intentions. 
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Secondly, the intentions of women are led to a lesser degree by these financial 
expectations of emigration compared to those of men. This is in line with what Vogler and 
Rotte (2000) find for panel data on immigration flows from 86 African and Asian countries: 
men react more strongly than women on economic factors. The really important factors in 
affecting intentions of women are networks, education, the household income position and the 
adoption of values that fit the western world (approximated by the attitude towards unmarried 
women moving abroad). The effect which self-efficacy can have on intentions is ambiguous 
as it matters only to some extent for men in Senegal. Furthermore, the effect is quite small, 
suggesting that potential emigrants do not seem to possess a typical psychological character 
trait that would make them successful in the countries of destination. 
Thirdly, the marital status does not have an effect on the intentions of either men or 
women. As we mentioned earlier in section 5, one would expect a priori the marital status to 
be of some significance as those who are single have no ties with a (former) spouse or 
children and have the advantage of being flexible. In answering the intention question they 
may therefore contemplate emigration more often as a viable option. The estimation results 
defy this logic. However, the absence of an effect for men can be completely in line with day-
to-day experience and tradition of Muslim African societies where men take the lead in 
decision making. Being married should in that respect not be a factor of importance for men 
in considering the decision to move or to stay. For women the absence of an effect represents 
more of a puzzle, as their intention to move abroad would depend on their husband’s choice. 
One reason why marital status does not exert an independent effect on migration decisions  of 
women (except for Senegalese women) is that for them emigration is not a free choice when 
they are single - society does not condone it - nor when they are married – they either follow 
their husband abroad or they stay behind and live on the remittances that are sent back home. 
The fact that marital status does not affect intentions in an independent manner may to some 
extent also be explained by the fact that some background variables, like age, already cover 
the influence of marital status. 
Finally, the effect that education has on emigration differs clearly across men and women 
and thereby sheds some interesting light on the relevance of self-selection theories as these 
theories generally do not pay attention to gender roles; roles which evidently are important for 
understanding migration flows and structures as Table 6 shows. The positive self-selection 
effect for Ghana in Table 5 was clearly driven by the fact that this selection effect applies only 
for Ghanaian women, whereas education does not exert a notable force on the intentions of 
men. To a lesser extent the same can be said of Egypt, although positive self-selection is 
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present both among women and men. The reverse case applies to Morocco where negative 
self-selection applies solely to the intentions of men and education plays no role at all for 
women. In Senegal one can detect only a weak case of positive self-selection for men. 
 
7. Conclusion and Discussion 
Who leaves Africa? And what forces drive them out of Africa? Is it the lure of the rich West 
or is it the poverty and the loss of future of Africa that drives people across the border? 
Simple as these questions may sound, they have received different answers and unfortunately 
there is only scarce micro-evidence on the importance of the various factors that are at play in 
Africa. Still the importance for gaining a quantitative insight into this question is building up 
as Africa is one of the continents that will influence global migration flows for the next fifty 
years (see, e.g., United Nations, 2002, and Hatton and Williamson, 2003b). 
Based on migration surveys that were held in four African countries (Ghana, Senegal, 
Egypt and Morocco) in the period 1997/1998 we show how high the emigration intentions are 
and what drives these intentions. The survey data show clearly that the emigration pressure is 
high in some countries (Ghana, Senegal), whereas in a country like Egypt the ‘pressure’ (i.e. 
emigration intentions) does not seem to take on dramatic proportions. What seems to be clear 
across the countries considered is that emigration ‘out of Africa’ is the dominant stated 
preference and that the typical potential migrant is young, male, and someone who has 
modern values, but if one had to sum up what dominates the pressure to emigrate ‘out of 
Africa’, it would be just two words: great expectations. The intention to emigrate is clearly 
driven – in all four African countries - by economic motives and expectations, especially 
among young men. The expectations of financial gains tied to migration together with an 
optimistic view of finding a job in the country of destination influences the intention to 
emigrate in all four countries quite heavily. What is perhaps noteworthy is that men give more 
weight to the argument of expected financial gains of emigration than women. Although this 
is completely in line with what one would expect, the force of expectations on emigration 
intentions is quite strong and, as far as we know, for empirical international migration studies 
it is a novel element. This particular insight underscores the theoretical analysis of O’Connell 
(1997) on migration decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. 
However, besides these general observations, one cannot distil more encompassing  
stylized ‘facts’ of migration. ‘Who leaves?’ is perhaps a simple question, in practice it is a 
question that is extremely difficult to answer as each and every country is characterised by 
specific elements that seem to trigger emigration (intentions). The roles played by education, 
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income position and labour force status in forming intentions are not as robust and as 
overwhelming as the previously mentioned expectations and the demographics of age and sex. 
Poverty is a driving force as well as being unemployed in most countries, but none of these 
findings should be treated as an ironclad rule. Each country tells a different story. For 
instance, poverty (as measured by an insufficient income position) does not play a role of 
importance in Senegal, unemployment is not a notable driving force in Egypt and Ghana. 
Self-efficacy plays no distinguishable role in Ghana, Morocco and Egypt and finally the effect 
of education on migration intentions is completely ambiguous. Close inspection of the effect 
of education for both men and women reveals that strong positive self-selection effects are 
only present among Ghanaian and Egyptian women. The evidence for men is mixed: positive 
self-selection only applies to Egyptian and (to some extent) Senegalese men, negative self-
selection is even present among Moroccan men and the education of Ghanaian men does not 
affect their intentions. 
  A last finding that needs to be included in this conclusion is that social network 
effects leave their mark in increasing the intention to emigrate but not as much as one would 
expect. In Ghana and Egypt the effect of having a household member who has been an 
international migrant or who still is a migrant is clearly important and exerts a strong force on 
the intentions of potential migrants. But given the fact that social network effects on 
intentions are virtually absent in Senegal and Morocco, this casts some doubts about the 
general importance of social network effects for migration intentions. This finding contrasts 
strongly with the actual practice of migration where networks have proven to a be a structural 
driving force. One reason why this may be so is that either the formulation of intentions is an 
entirely different issue than realising intentions and actually emigrating; or emigration in 
countries like Morocco and Ghana are heavily influenced by a nation-wide migration culture. 
The case of Senegal may perhaps be the result of region-specific migration culture. 
Now what do these findings imply for the future of these countries and the countries of 
destination? In our introduction we cited some opinions of well- informed economists on the 
future of Africa and they were not particularly optimistic. The migration pressure is real and 
will be hard to redress. Hatton and Williamson (2002) conclude their review of migration 
forces in our world of today by making the following (under)statement: “if OECD countries 
think they have an immigration problem now, they are going to find the future even more 
challenging.” The ultimate question is, of course, whether the prime forces that trigger 
emigration (and the underlying intentions) might also diminish this pressure in the near future. 
Immigration countries – both the traditional immigration countries like USA and Australia, 
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but also countries in Europe – are grappling with the consequences of immigration and a 
slower pace of immigration would seem more desirable as the institutions and citizens in most 
of these countries can adjust to accommodate the inflow of immigrants. As far as one can rely 
on intentions as predictors of future behaviour, the estimation results do make clear that the 
emigration pressure will not subside for a considerable time. First of all, it takes time for 
economic prospects in these African countries to improve and once they have improved 
closing the gap between African and Western standards of living will be difficult if not 
impossible. And secondly, we know from actual migration experience that the transnational 
networks turn out to have an important effect on emigration decisions. In short, it are these 
forces (great expectations about economic gains, poverty, a relatively young age structure and 
social networks) that will stimulate emigration out of Africa for years if not decades to come, 
whereas the most important countervailing force (strong catching up processes in the African 
economies) lacks credibility and will probably not affect the expectations of populations in a 
significant manner for years to come. 
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Figure 1: Migration, expectations and self-selection of the skilled 
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Table 1: Who wants to emigrate (or not) and why? 
 Potential emigrants from (%): 
 Ghana Morocco Senegal Egypt 
Intention to migrate 41 20 38 12 
Motivation to 
emigrate: 
    
Economic reasons 79 91 89 83 
Family reasons 5 5 3 9 
Other reasonsa 15 5 8 8 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Motivation to stay:     
No financial needs 10 33 6 9 
Lack of means 23 4 14 1 
Family reasons 23 30 40 64 
Other reasonsb 45 32 40 27 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Schoorl et al. (2000), weighted data. 
(a) Other reasons refer to education, adventure, fear of persecution, etc. 
(b) Other reasons refer to old age, legal problems of emigration, do not like living abroad, etc. 
 
 
Table 2: Top-3 of preferred countries of destination 
Potential migrants from: Popularity of preferred country of 
destination Ghana Morocco Senegal Egypt 
First place USA Spain USA Saudi Arabia 
Second place Germany Italy Italy Kuwait 
Third Place UK France France United Arabic Emirates 
Cumulative percentage no. 1-3 65 67 69 71 
Cumulative percentage EU -countries 44 98 48 13 
Source:  Schoorl et al. (2000: 120), weighted data, and own calculations. 
  
Table 3: How firm are the intentions to emigrate? 
Potential migrants from (percentages):  
Ghana Morocco Senegal Egypt 
Intention to emigrate 41 20 38 12 
Intention to emigrate within two years 13 4 5 1 
Has taken actual steps to emigrate 8 3 2 0 
Source: Schoorl et al. (2000), weighted data 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics, unweighted sample means (18-65 years) 
Dependent variable – emigration intention Ghana Morocco Senegal  Egypt  
   No intentions 51.9  71.4  63.6  87.2  
   Yes, but unsure when 25.9  21.5  30.6  9.8  
   Yes, after more than one year 11.5  4.4  3.3  2.0  
   Yes, within a year 10.7  2.7  2.5  1.0  
Independent variables:     
Age (in years) 34.0  41.7  33.9  36.9  
Sex – Female 57.9  28.1  58.6  72.9  
Marital status     
  Single 34.0  17.8  30.8  20.2  
  Ever married (married, divorced, widowed) 66.0  82.2  69.2  79.8  
Education (level achieved)     
  No education 14.5  74.8  77.2  55.6  
  Primary 54.3  14.4  17.3  14.3  
  Secondary 25.5  6.9  5.0  20.1  
  Higher 5.7  3.9  0.5  10.0  
Income position     
  More than sufficient 1.0  5.0  1.1  4.1  
  Sufficient 31.2  39.3  26.1  64.4  
  Barely sufficient 36.6  37. 4  51.7  24.9  
  Insufficient 31.2  18.3  21.1  6.6  
Work status      
  Employer 46.6  27.5  36.1  7.5  
  Employee 30.3  32.2  22.9  28.1  
  Unemployed 5.9  2.7  4.1  3.2  
  Student 8.7  4.1  4.5  4.9  
  Housework or inactivity  8.5  33.5  32.4  56.3  
Household connections      
  Household with only non-migrants 62.3  60.4  33.4  36.3  
  Household with return migrants 7.7  3.7  21.3  27.4  
  Household with current migrants 28.9  33.1  31.8  27.3  
  Household with current and return migrants 1.1  2.8  13.5  9.0  
Approval of unmarried women migrating      
   Approve 66.6  25.8  54.0  5.1  
   Neither approve nor disapprove 14.9  22.6  1.6  1.3  
   Disapprove 18.5  51.6  44.4  93.6  
Self-efficacy (possibility of direction life)     
   Possible to determine what happens in life  65.6  39.9  20.2  9.8  
   Not possible, up to fate 34.4  60.1  79.8  90.2  
Region a      
  1 MD + EM 25.6  11.3  50.5  21.7  
  2 MD +RM 14.1  52.7  - 23.4  
  3 LD + EM 27.5  15.7  - 33.3  
  4 LD + RM 32.8  20.3  49.5  21.6  
Expected financial gains from migration      
  No 26.4  36.5  20.2  27.2  
  Yes, expected gains 73.6 63.5  79.8  72.8  
Job search costs     
   In the home country easier 22.9  4.8  7.2  75.8  
   Equally easy 17.0  21.5  24.4  11.0  
   In a European country easier 60.1  74.0  68.4  13.2  
Valid N =  1569 583 2267 2940 
(a)  The regions are subdivided along two dimensions: development and migration history: MD = More developed and LD =Less developed; EM = established 
migration region; and RM = recent migration region.  
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Table 5: Ordered probit analysis of emigration intentions of non-migrants (18-65 years) 
 Ghana Morocco 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Age -0.04** (0.00) -0.04** (0.00) -0.07** (0.01) -0.07** (0.01) 
Sex (Male = 0) -0.35** (0.07) -0.36** (0.07) -1.08** (0.21) -1.10** (0.24) 
Marital status (single =0)         
   Ever Married 0.09 (0.08) 0.10 (0.08) -0.01 (0.19) -0.01 (0.20) 
Education  (No education = 0)         
  Primary 0.23** (0.10) 0.25** (0.11) -0.41** (0.17) -0.45** (0.17) 
  Secondary 0.24** (0.12) 0.25** (0.12) -0.32 (0.30) -0.33 (0.27) 
  Higher 0.33* (0.18) 0.38** (0.18) -0.44 (0.33) -0.56 (0.38) 
Income position (sufficient = 0)         
  More than sufficient 0.64** (0.31) 0.67** (0.30) -0.99* (0.51) -1.13** (0.54) 
  Barely sufficient 0.05 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08) 0.24 (0.16) 0.26 (0.17) 
  Insufficient 0.27** (0.08) 0.26** (0.09) 0.57** (0.22) 0.60** (0.23) 
Work status (Employee/worker =0)         
  Employer/owner business -0.19** (0.08) -0.20** (0.08) -0.31* (0.16) -0.40** (0.17) 
  Unemployed -0.03 (0.13) -0.03 (0.13) 0.83** (0.39) 0.87** (0.40) 
  Student -0.15 (0.11) -0.16* (0.10) 0.08 (0.31) 0.06 (0.33) 
  Housework or inactive -0.38** (0.12) -0.39** (0.12) 0.04 (0.21) -0.07 (0.23) 
Household connections (none = 0)         
  With return migrants -0.04 (0.12) -0.04 (0.12) -0.43 (0.31) -0.36 (0.35) 
  With current migrants 0.31** (0.07) 0.31** (0.07) -0.19 (0.19) -0.11 (0.20) 
  With current and return migrants 0.33 (0.26) 0.39 (0.26) 0.22 (0.26) 0.15 (0.27) 
Modernity value -women migrating 
(approve =0) 
        
   Approve nor disapprove -0.41** (0.10) -0.40** (0.09) -0.86** (0.17) -0.89** (0.18) 
   Disapprove -0.38** (0.09) -0.40** (0.09) -0.68** (0.18) -0.73** (0.19) 
Self-efficacy (possible to determine = 0)         
   Not possible, up to fate -0.06 (0.07) -0.06 (0.07) -0.13 (0.13) -0.24* (0.13) 
Region dummies  (1 MD + EM = 0)         
  2 MD +RM 0.30** (0.11) 0.31** (0.11) 0.17 (0.21) 0.21 (0.22) 
  3 LD + EM 0.25** (0.09) 0.27** (0.09) 0.21 (0.24) 0.25 (0.26) 
  4 LD + RM 0.36** (0.08) 0.40** (0.09) 0.06 (0.23) 0.14 (0.24) 
Optimism gains from migration (no = 0)         
  Yes, expected gains - - 0.66** (0.09) - - 1.12** (0.22) 
Optimism job search ( easier at home = 0)         
   Equally easy - - -0.18* (0.11) - - -0.42 (0.45) 
   Easier in Europe - - -0.02 (0.08) - - -0.02 (0.41) 
Threshold point 1 -1.22 (0.22) -1.24 (0.23) -4.00 (0.54) -4.41 (0.65) 
Threshold point 2 -0.40 (0.22) -0.38 (0.23) -2.63 (0.51) -2.93 (0.62) 
Threshold point 3 0.11 (0.22) 0.14 (0.23) -2.04 (0.49) -2.31 (0.60) 
N = 1569 1569 562 562 
Wald c2(df) 299.5 384.5 238.9 226.9 
Log-likelihood -1680.6 -1640.5 -325.4 -311.5 
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.112 0.282 0.329 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses, the symbols * denote P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05.  Estimation results are unweighted. 
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Table 5 (continued): ordered probit analysis of emigration intentions of non-migrants 
(18-65 years)  
 Senegal Egypt 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Age -0.03** (0.00) -0.04** (0.00) -0.04** (0.00) -0.05** (0.00) 
Sex (Male = 0) -0.85** (0.08) -0.95** (0.08) -1.03** (0.10) -1.03** (0.10) 
Marital status (single =0)         
   Ever Married -0.32** (0.08) -0.31** (0.08) -0.09 (0.09) -0.14 (0.09) 
Education  (No education = 0)         
  Primary 0.18** (0.09) 0.20** (0.09) 0.19* (0.12) 0.17 (0.12) 
  Secondary 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.14) 0.45** (0.10) 0.45** (0.11) 
  Higher -0.81** (0.41) -0.97** (0.44) 0.65** (0.12) 0.67** (0.13) 
Income position (sufficient = 0)         
  More than sufficient 0.06 (0.32) 0.05 (0.36) -0.08 (0.17) -0.07 (0.15) 
  Barely sufficient -0.07 (0.09) -0.11 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 
  Insufficient -0.06 (0.11) -0.07 (0.11) 0.33** (0.16) 0.32* (0.16) 
Work status (Employee =0)         
  Employer/owner business 0.01 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08) -0.29** (0.14) -0.31** (0.15) 
  Unemployed 0.36** (0.12) 0.39** (0.11) 0.05 (0.16) 0.06 (0.16) 
  Student -0.16 (0.14) -0.19 (0.14) -0.13 (0.12) -0.14 (0.12) 
  Housework or inactive 0.00 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) -0.51** (0.10) -0.58** (0.10) 
Household connections (none = 0)         
  With retur n migrants 0.08 (0.10) 0.08 (0.10) 0.28** (0.10) 0.31** (0.10) 
  With current migrants -0.02 (0.08) -0.02 (0.09) 0.30** (0.09) 0.31** (0.09) 
  With current and return migrants 0.13 (0.10) 0.15 (0.11) 0.40** (0.14) 0.44** (0.14) 
Modernity value – Women migrating 
(approve =0) 
        
   Approve nor disapprove -0.20 (0.24) -0.19 (0.25) -0.47 (0.32) -0.63** (0.31) 
   Disapprove -0.36** (0.07) -0.45** (0.07) -0.46** (0.12) -0.54** (0.13) 
Self-efficacy (possible to determine = 0)         
   Not possible, up to fate -0.20** (0.07) -0.22** (0.07) 0.04 (0.12) 0.11 (0.13) 
Region dummies  (1 MD + EM = 0)         
  2 MD +RM - - - - 0.14 (0.12) 0.16 (0.12) 
  3 LD + EM - - - - 0.13 (0.12) 0.19 (0.12) 
  4 LD + RM -0.65** (0.08) -0.70** (0.08) 0.17 (0.12) 0.23* (0.13) 
Optimism gains from migration (no = 0)         
  Yes, expected gains - - 1.22** (0.13) - - 1.01** (0.14) 
Optimism job search ( easier at home = 0)         
   Equally easy - - -0.05 (0.13) - - 0.31** (0.11) 
   Easier in Europe - - 0.49** (0.12) - - 0.53** (0.09) 
Threshold point 1 -2.82 (0.19) -3.69 (0.23) -2.00 (0.30) -2.06 (0.35) 
Threshold point 2 -1.16 (0.19) -1.93 (0.21) -0.86 (0.30) -0.80 (0.35) 
Threshold point 3 -0.69 (0.19) -1.45 (0.22) -0.24 (0.30) -0.15 (0.35) 
N = 2267 2267 2940 2940 
Wald c2(df)  639.9 675.6 515.2 674.0 
Log-likelihood -1499.4 -1403.4 -965.9 -896.1 
Pseudo R2 0.226 0.275 0.300 0.351 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses, the symbols * denote P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05.  Estimation results are unweighted. 
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Table 6: Ordered probit analysis of emigration intentions of non-migrants (18-65 years): 
men versus women 
 Ghana Morocco 
 Men Women Men Women 
 Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Age -0.04** (0.01) -0.04** (0.00) -0.08** (0.01) -0.06** (0.02) 
Marital status (single =0)         
   Ever Married 0.11 (0.13) 0.10 (0.11) 0.11 (0.23) 0.37 (0.53) 
Education  (No education = 0)         
  Primary 0.02 (0.26) 0.30** (0.12) -0.68** (0.20) 0.55 (0.48) 
  Secondary and  higher 0.16 (0.26) 0.34** (0.14) -0.38 (0.26) 0.21 (0.86) 
Income position (sufficient or  more = 0)         
  Barely sufficient -0.16 (0.12) 0.13 (0.11) 0.13 (0.19) 0.87** (0.29) 
  Insufficient 0.04 (0.12) 0.40** (0.11) 0.54** (0.23) 1.77** (0.83) 
Work status (Employee =0)         
  Employer/owner business -0.20* (0.12) -0.20* (0.11) -0.48** (0.17) 1.21* (0.71) 
  Unemployed -0.00 (0.19) -0.08 (0.18) 0.86** (0.44) -a (-) 
  Student -0.28** (0.13) -0.01 (0.16) 0.05 (0.40) 1.03 (0.66) 
  Housework or inactive -0.47** (0.23) -0.38** (0.15) -0.03 (0.24) 0.51 (0.52) 
Household connections (none = 0)         
  With return migrants -0.23 (0.18) 0.05 (0.15) 0.01 (0.46) -0.57 (0.58) 
  With current migrants 0.24** (0.11) 0.38** (0.10) -0.18 (0.22) 0.10 (0.49) 
  With current and return migrants 0.45* (0.27) 0.32 (0.45) 0.02 (0.29) 0.28 (0.68) 
Modernity value - Women migrating 
(approve =0) 
        
   Neutral or disapprove -0.30** (0.10) -0.49** (0.10) -0.63** (0.19) -1.30** (0.33) 
Self-efficacy (possible to determine = 0)         
   Not possible, up to fate 0.05 (0.10) -0.13 (0.09) -0.18 (0.15) -0.28 (0.34) 
Region dummies  (1 MD + EM = 0)         
  2 MD +RM 0.40** (0.16) 0.35** (0.17) 0.15 (0.22) -0.20 (0.73) 
  3 LD + EM 0.12 (0.13) 0.42** (0.13) 0.06 (0.28) 1.13 (0.79) 
  4 LD + RM 0.39** (0.12) 0.46** (0.12) 0.05 (0.27) -0.07 (0.67) 
Optimism gains from migration (no = 0)         
  Yes, expected gains 0.64** (0.14) 0.66** (0.11) 1.20** (0.25) 0.85** (0.39) 
Optimism job search (easier or equally 
easy at home = 0) 
        
   Easier in Europe 0.17* (0.10) -0.02 (0.09) 0.38 (0.26) 0.16 (0.45) 
Threshold point 1 -1.41 (0.38) -0.48 (0.28) -3.17 (0.48) -0.43 (1.17) 
Threshold point 2 -0.61 (0.38) 0.43 (0.28) -1.67 (0.46) 1.07 (1.15) 
Threshold point 3 0.06 (0.38) 0.81 (0.28) -1.01 (0.45) 1.51 (1.10) 
N = 660 909 409 162 
Wald c2(df) 143.6 216.0 183.9 92.0 
Log-likelihood -760.5 -866.9 -238.4 -61.0 
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.110 0.332 0.355 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses, the symbols * denote P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05.  Estimation results are unweighted.  
(a) variable dropped due to collinearity. 
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Table 6 (continued): ordered probit analysis of emigration intentions of non-migrants 
(18-65 years)  
 Senegal Egypt 
 Men Women Men Women 
 Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Age -0.05** (0.01) -0.03** (0.00) -0.06** (0.01) -0.03** (0.01) 
Marital status (single =0)         
   Ever Married -0.15 (0.12) -0.41** (0.12) -0.13 (0.16) 0.01 (0.14) 
Education  (No education = 0)         
  Primary 0.25** (0.11) 0.20 (0.14) 0.03 (0.17) 0.35** (0.17) 
  Secondary and higher 0.06 (0.15) -0.20 (0.28) 0.44** (0.14) 0.59** (0.15) 
Income position (sufficient and  more = 0)         
  Barely sufficient -0.25** (0.11) 0.03 (0.12) 0.14 (0.13) -0.13 (0.14) 
  Insufficient -0.17 (0.14) -0.05 (0.15) 0.71** (0.24) -0.05 (0.24) 
Work status (Employee =0)         
  Employer/owner business 0.13 (0.10) -0.09 (0.15) -0.36** (0.17) -0.46 (0.47) 
  Unemployed 0.37** (0.15) 0.55** (0.19) 0.38 (0.25) -0.20 (0.25) 
  Student -0.18 (0.18) -0.08 (0.23) -0.34** (0.14) 0.07 (0.22) 
  Housework or inactive -0.19 (0.20) 0.09 (0.14) -0.38 (0.24) -0.59** (0.12) 
Household connections (none = 0)         
  With return migrants 0.08 (0.12) 0.09 (0.13) 0.32** (0.15) 0.32** (0.15) 
  With current migrants 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.13) 0.31** (0.12) 0.39** (0.15) 
  With current and return migrants -0.08 (0.15) 0.33** (0.14) 0.47** (0.22) 0.47** (0.20) 
Modernity value - Women migrating 
(approve =0) 
        
   Neutral or disapprove -0.35** (0.09) -0.49** (0.10) 0.26 (0.21) -0.73** (0.14) 
Self-efficacy (possible to determine = 0)         
   Not possible, up to fate -0.21** (0.09) -0.14 (0.11) 0.20 (0.18) -0.11 (0.16) 
Region dummies  (1 MD + EM = 0)         
  2 MD +RM - - - - 0.22 (0.17) 0.09 (0.16) 
  3 LD + EM - - - - 0.36** (0.17) 0.02 (0.16) 
  4 LD + RM -0.49** (0.10) -0.92* (0.11) 0.45** (0.17) -0.08 (0.20) 
Optimism gains from migration (no = 0)         
  Yes, expected gains 0.99** (0.17) 1.20** (0.15) 1.37** (0.18) 0.60** (0.16) 
Optimism job search (easier or equally 
easy  at home = 0) 
        
   Easier in Europe 0.58** (0.10) 0.44** (0.09) 0.55** (0.11) 0.41** (0.13) 
Threshold point 1 -2.64 (0.23) -1.08 (0.26) -0.29 (0.45) -0.09 (0.43) 
Threshold point 2 -0.90 (0.22) 0.75 (0.26) 1.01 (0.45) 1.27 (0.45) 
Threshold point 3 -0.36 (0.23) 1.12 (0.28) 1.81 (0.45) 1.47 (0.46) 
N = 949 1356 798 2142 
Wald c2(df) 332.5 365.4 356.0 198.8 
Log-likelihood -752.2 -650.5 -496.9 -372.7 
Pseudo R2 0.231 0.259 0.298 0.238 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses, the symbols * denote P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05.  Estim ation results are unweighted. 
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Endnotes: 
                                                                 
1 During the process of writing this paper we discovered that we were not the only ones who used the film title 
‘Out of Africa’ as the leading title for a paper. Kuyvenhoven (1997) and Hatton and Williamson (2003a, 2003b) 
used this title earlier than we did and the credit for using this title should go to them. We have stuck, however, to 
our title as it describes the phenomenon of emigration in Africa so well: the majority of emigrants longs for a 
move ‘out of Africa’. 
2 Pioneered by Sjaastad (1962) and later on extended by economists like Bhagwati (1975), Mincer (1978), Simon 
(1989), Borjas (1994), Galor (1991) and Chiswick (1999). 
3 We use the male notation for a typical migrant in this section not just out of convenience but primarily because 
most of the empirical migration literature points out that men are often the ones who initiate the decision to 
emigrate. 
4 This is also related to the work by Tunali (2000) who shows for the case of Turkey that migration is viewed as 
a ‘lottery’: for a substantial portion of migrants the estimated gain of moving is negative and only a minority of 
movers realises very high returns. 
5 Testing O’Connell’s theory is also not possible as we have asked respondents directly about their expectations 
and not their assessment of the uncertainty surrounding expectations. 
6  See for an extensive description of the surveys Schoorl et al. (2000). 
7 In Morocco, the survey was carried out in the regions of Nador in North-Eastern Morocco and in less 
developed southern Tiznit, both characterised by a long migration history; as well as in the more recent 
migration areas of Larache (North-Western Atlantic coast), Settat (near Casablanca), and less developed 
Khenifra in the dry and mountainous south.  In Ghana, the regions studied included the developed regions of 
Greater Accra, and Ashanti, the latter characterised by more recent migration patterns; and the less developed 
regions of Eastern and Brong Ahafo. For Senegal, the choice fell on urban and relatively developed Dakar/Pikine 
and on the partly rural and less developed region of Diourbel/Tourba, both characterised by relatively recent 
migration patterns. The two regions together house about one third of the country’s population. Finally, in Egypt 
the following large regions were selected: Cairo and Alexandria (developed, established migration), urban lower 
and upper Egypt (developed with recent migration patterns), and rural lower and upper Egypt, both less 
developed regions, the former with more established migration flows than the latter. For more details see Schoorl 
et al. (2000). 
8 In order to obtain robust variance estimates we also control for possible interaction effects in the formation of 
intentions within households in the sample. The estimation method therefore relaxes the assumption of the 
independence of observations and requires only that observations are independent across clusters, in our case: 
households (White, 1980). All standard errors in this paper are corrected for this clustering effect. 
9 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this problem out to us. However, we have also ran 
separate regressions with the expectations questions, used in a direct manner, and these results  differ only 
marginally from the two-step procedure. We present the results from the latter procedure as these give a slightly 
better fit. 
10 See for a more in-depth study of the case of Morocco, Van der Erf and Heering (2002). 
11 Interested readers can obtain first-stage regression results upon request from the authors. 
12 Furthermore, we have checked for correlation between the intention to emigrate and the financial expectations 
tied to emigration and this correlation turns out to be quite low. 
13 In re -estimating the models a number of dummy variables had to be changed in order not to run into small 
sample problems. 
